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Abstract
This paper summarizes the results of other analyses by the author with regard to the
importance of relative cohort size (RCS) in determining male relative income (the income of young
adults relative to prime-age workers) and general patterns of economic growth, and in turn
influencing fertility in the currently more-developed nations.  It then goes on to demonstrate that
these same effects appear to have been operating in all of the 100-odd nations which have
experienced the fertility transition since 1950.  Parameter estimates based on the experience of all 189
countries identified by the United Nations between 1950 and 1995 are used to simulate the effects
on fertility of migration from Third to First World countries.  This exercise suggests that we get the
best of all possible outcomes with migration: population is reduced in “overcrowded” Third World
nations, total world population growth is substantially reduced, and scores of children are given the
opportunity of growing up with all the educational and health advantages of United States residents.
Introduction
Over the past 50 years we have heard doomsayers prophecy the destruction of civilization as
we know it, both through over- and under-population.  As mortality rates in less developed countries
began to fall in the 1960s, population growth rates in those parts of the world mushroomed, and it
became popular to speak of a “population explosion” which might lead to “standing room only” in
the next century.  Hard on the heels of that worry came the concern that the more developed
countries would disappear altogether, as their birth rates sank below replacement level.  
Such fears are not new: similar ones can be identified going back through the 1930s, when
scholars here and abroad worried that low rates of population growth would bring about a collapse
of the economic system, and at least as far back as the eighteenth century, when Thomas Malthus
turned economics into “the dismal science” with his worries about the ills of overpopulation.   These
types of fears tend to be based on simple extrapolations of current growth rates: are they realistic?
Is it possible that human beings might reproduce like cells in a petri dish— or sit watching as their
numbers dwindle to nothingness?
The simple answers are “no,” “no,” and “no.”  Based on the evidence of our history over the
past century, it seems clear that there are fundamental self-regulating mechanisms underlying and
intertwining population and economic growth, which would prevent such catastrophic movements
in either direction.  Like Adam Smith’s “invisible hand,” they have operated to maintain a long-term
equilibrium in those growth rates, at least since the demographic transition.
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Figure 1: Relative cohort size in the United States,
using two alternative age ratios.  The dashed line
indicates the ratio of those aged 15 to 24 to those
aged 25 to 59 (scaled by multiplying by 2.5).  The
solid line indicates the ratio of those aged 20 to 22
relative to those aged 45 to 49.
Figure 2: Estimated coefficients on age
shares in a regression of state-level personal
consumption expenditures per adult on
state-level income per adult and age
distribution in the U.S.: 1900, 1929, 1970,
1977 and 1982. (Source: Macunovich, 1998d).
One of the most basic mechanisms
regulating the pace of growth appears to be the
proportion of the population aged about 15-24 —1
especially relative to the proportion of prime-aged
adults.  (The ratio of this group to the population
aged 25 to 59 in the United States is illustrated in
Figure 1, along with another “more precise” labor
market indicator: the ratio of those aged 20 to 22
to those aged 45 to 49.)  In previous work this
author has demonstrated the pronounced pattern of consumption and dis-saving associated with this
age group (Macunovich 1998d), their effects on overall economic growth and on their own income
relative to that of prime age workers (Macunovich 1998a, 1999a, 1999b), and the tendency for
fertility to respond directly to changes in male relative income (Macunovich 1996, 1998b, 1998c).
In this paper I will quickly summarize some of the findings from those studies, and then illustrate how
they appear to create a self-regulating mechanism which can
be traced through the demographic transition in scores of
countries, just as they can be traced through baby booms and
busts in more developed countries.
Summary of Earlier Findings
Macunovich (1998d) demonstrates strong age-specific
patterns of expenditure, holding income constant, using state-
level data during the whole of this century in the United
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Figure 3: Simulated effects of changing age structure on United States expenditures and income.  Left: Index of
simulated real per capita consumption expenditures in the United States as a function of age structure in the
population— holding all other factors constant.  Right: Index of “age adjusted income”: residuals after regressing
ln(real income per adult aged 16 to 64) on the age distribution of adults aged 16 to 64.  
The shaded portion of each graph indicates the period of increased rates of saving and productivity growth induced
by age structure when the baby boomers were younger.  The period to the right of the shaded area indicates the
increasing level of per capita expenditures generated by the baby boomers as they entered the “young adult” years,
which spurred overall economic growth but reduced savings— and hence productivity growth and the growth in real
per capita incomes. (Source: Macunovich, 1998d).
States.  As illustrated in Figure 2, these results support the idea of “life cycle” saving and spending,
with younger and older adults spending heavily and prime-aged adults tending to save a larger
proportion of their income.  A novel finding in this study, however, relates to patterns of expenditure
generated by children.  It has been assumed traditionally that children cause parents to “dis-save” at
high rates, but this study demonstrates that parents’ patterns of expenditure differ dramatically
depending on the age of the children, and that the “dis-saving” traditionally associated with children
is instead a result of the (highly correlated) age patterns of their parents.  Those with very young
children save much less— and in most recent years do “dis-save” to some extent— as do those with
teenagers.  But those with children aged about 5 to 15 save heavily, on average— probably in
preparation for expected higher levels of spending as the children grow older.  
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These differential patterns of expenditure by age of child mean that the passage of the Baby
Boom from infancy through the teen years generated strong fluctuations in savings and expenditure,
and simulations demonstrate that these patterns appear to explain a large proportion of observed
changes in the economy in the postwar period (see Figure 3).
The primary labor market effect of relative birth cohort size (RCS), as postulated by Easterlin
(1968, 1978, 1980, 1987) and demonstrated for the United States by Welch (1979) and Freeman
(1979), among others, is on the relative earnings of young males— that is, on their earnings relative
to those of older males.   This effect occurs largely because of the fact that young, less experienced2
workers are not perfect substitutes in the labor market for older, more experienced workers, and the
production function’ is sensitive to the balance of these two types of workers.  If we have an
oversupply of one type of worker relative to the other (think of it as an oversupply of assembly-line
workers relative to management) the wages of the oversupplied group will tend to go down relative
to the wages of the under-supplied group.
This effect of imperfect substitutability has been documented by labor economists, as noted
above.  However, because relative wages and employment prospects did not begin to improve when
relative cohort size declined in the United States (i.e., once the peak of the baby boom had entered
the labor market in 1979/80), labor economists began to assume that they had overestimated relative
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Figure 4: Predicted (+) and actual hourly wages of young men by experience and education, relative to those of
prime-aged males with 25 to 34 years of work experience.  Predicted values are based on the relative cohort size
model presented in Macunovich (1999a).
cohort size effects, and turned to other factors for analysis.  Macunovich (1998a, 1999a, 1999b)
demonstrates however that relative cohort size effects on relative male wages continue to be very
strong, once allowance is made for asymmetry in those effects: the fact that positive aggregate
demand effects of cohort size tend to buoy up the economy and buffer relative wages when cohort
size is increasing, while the shock of any turnaround in this increase tends to slow the economy, with
young workers hardest hit in the slowdown.  Figure 4 illustrates the historic pattern of male relative
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Figure 5: Male relative income (annual earnings of men with 1 to 5 years of work experience, relative to the annual
income five years earlier of families with children, with head of either sex aged 45 to 54), by race and educational
attainment (source: author’s tabulations of March Current Population Survey public use tapes).
wages for a number of different education and experience groups, together with fitted values based
on the relative cohort size model in Macunovich (1999a).
Richard Easterlin (1987) hypothesized that we tend to evaluate our earnings relative to some
internalized measure of our desired standard of living.  This internalized standard will be strongly
affected by the standard of living we have experienced in our parents’ homes.  Because of this, and
because relative earnings are a measure of the earnings of young males relative to those of older
males, then, on average the pattern of male relative earnings gives us a good indication of the pattern
of male earnings relative to material aspirations in aggregate in the population.
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Figure 6: Proportions of men married in their first two years out of school, by level of education, full time work
status and race (source: author’s tabulations from March CPS public use tapes).
Figure 5 illustrates the observed pattern of male relative income (an annualized equivalent of the male
relative wages in Figure 4) among white and African American high school and college graduates,
estimated using Easterlin’s definition.   What happens when these relative earnings decline by about3
50 percent— as they did from the 1960s through the 1980s?  (This ratio indicates the proportion of
recent parental annual income that a young man can reproduce in his first few years out in the labor
market: for African-American college graduates this declined from 125 percent to only about 65
percent during this period— and from about 75 percent to only 40 percent for white college
graduates.) 
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Figure 7: Race- and age-specific fertility rates, for women aged 15-24. [Source: Ventura et al (1998) for 15-17 and 18-
19; Ventura et al (1996) and Peters et al (1997) for 20-24.]
Easterlin hypothesized that, in an attempt to close the gap between income and aspirations,
members of relatively large cohorts will tend to make a number of adjustments including increased
female labor force participation and delayed/reduced marriage and childbearing.  The results in
Macunovch (1996, 1998b, 1998c) support this hypothesis: a model based only on male relative
income and women’s hourly wage is able to predict over 99 percent of the variation in fertility and
labor force participation among women aged 20 to 24: those with the highest reproductive potential,
who are expected to be most strongly affected by Easterlin’s hypothesis.  Figures 6 and 7 demonstrate
the similarity of patterns of marriage and fertility among various groups.  We can also see how similar
these patterns are to that of male relative income: the long decline prior to about 1985, and then the
“hump” in most of these series in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
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Figure 8: Patterns of demographic transition for Sweden, Colombia and North Korea.  Note the long period of decline
in the death rate in Sweden before the fertility transition began.
The Role of Age Structure in Promoting the Demographic Transition
“Demographic transition” is the period during which a country passes from high to low birth
and death rates.  Prior to the transition there is little if any population growth, often despite fertility
rates of seven births per woman or more, because of high mortality— especially infant mortality.  This
was the case in the currently developed countries prior to the nineteenth century, and in many
developing countries as recently as the middle of this century. 
Characteristically the transition to lower death rates precedes the transition to lower fertility,
and this imbalance between the two rates produces rapid population growth until fertility rates begin
to decline.  This has been the situation in currently developing countries, which led to the widely-
publicized fears about “population explosion” in the 1970s.  Exacerbating this effect, improvements
in health which tend to accompany mortality decline often lead to temporary increases in the fertility
rate, until couples’ concerns about excessive family size provide motivation for the use of
contraceptives.
Most of the population growth which the human species has experienced— and probably will
ever experience— occurs as a result of this transition.  Because of this, an important aspect of
demographic research has been the attempt to identify factors which determine the length of the gap
between mortality decline and fertility decline.  In general, the currently developed countries took 50
(deaths per 1000 popn.)
crude death rate
(births per 1000 popn.)
crude birth rate
(deaths per 500 births)
infant mortality
Mozambique
year
1895 1915 1935 1955 1975 1995
0
25
50
75
100
-10-
Figure 9: Vital rates in Mozambique, a country
which has not yet begun the fertility transition,
despite declines in infant mortality.
years or more to pass through the transition, while in a number of developing countries the transition
has occurred in a single decade (Figure 8).
Demographers and economists have demonstrated a strong correlation between fertility and
infant mortality rates (deaths per 1000 live births), suggesting that the motivation to control fertility
arises from parents’ concerns about excessive family size.  And yet, despite the correlation between
fertility and infant mortality, decline in the latter has not
been a good predictor of the initiation of decline in the
former, in currently developing countries.  By the late
1980s many countries— especially in Sub-Saharan
Africa— had not yet experienced any fertility decline despite
decreasing infant mortality, as in the case of Mozambique
(Figure 9).
In addition, standard economic measures appear not to be good predictors of the start of the
fertility transition, as evidenced by the following statement from Caldwell (1997:20-21):
“The search for materialist thresholds is frustrating.  If we compare Britain in 1871
with a range of countries in Asia and Africa a century later when their fertility was
beginning to fall or soon would fall, some surprising findings emerge. . .In terms of
real per capita income. . . Britain was at the start of its fertility decline, ten times as
wealthy as Bangladesh, and almost twice as rich as Thailand.  The proportion of its
workforce working outside agriculture was four times that in Bangladesh or Kenya
and more than double Sri Lanka’s proportion.  Its proportion of population living in
conurbations with more than half a million inhabitants was eighteen times the
proportion in Sri Lanka and even six times that in Thailand.”
We know that the reduction in infant mortality occurs as a result of the spread of modern medicine
and hygiene, but what causes fertility rates finally to take the plunge?
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The United Nations (1998) provides estimates for nearly 200 nations at five year intervals
from 1950 through 1995, of some of the vital rates used by economists and demographers in
analyzing this question: crude birth and death rates (births and deaths per 1000 population), infant
mortality, total fertility rates and life expectancy.  More importantly, from the perspective of this
analysis, they provide data on population age structure (the proportion of the total population aged
under 5, 5 to 14, 15 to 24 and 60+).  These data suggest that relative cohort size (RCS, approximated
using the ratio of 15 to 24 year olds to those aged 25 to 59 )— probably acting through effects on4
male relative income— has played a crucial role in bringing about the fertility transition in developing
countries during that period.
Relative Cohort Size Effects— in the Third World?
The mechanism is hypothesized to be similar to that observed in the United States and other
industrialized nations: an excess supply of young relative to prime-age males depresses the relative
wages of the young men, thereby reducing their earning potential relative to their material aspirations
as shaped in their parental households.  This would lead young couples to delay or forego marriage
and/or reduce fertility in an attempt to maintain a higher level of per capita disposable income.  The
surprise here is not that we can observe the relative income effect operating on fertility in newly
developing economies, but rather that such a strong market mechanism should be observable
there— one which differentiates workers by age and level of experience in order to translate changes
in relative cohort size into changes in relative income.  But the evidence, as we shall see, appears
overwhelming.
Undoubtedly institutional and cultural differences among countries must temper the
relationship between relative cohort size and relative income across nations and regions.  Strong
-12-
unions, for example, which maintain high wages for current members at the expense of new labor
market entrants (probably as a protective measure during periods of large relative cohort size), would
tend to counteract positive effects of subsequent smaller relative cohort size.  
Similarly, countries with strong policies encouraging wage cuts rather than layoffs during
periods of excess labor supply might dilute relative cohort size effects, if wage cuts occur across all
experience groups.  Studies have found that while the United States tends to have “sticky wages” that
promote high unemployment during such periods, many European countries trade that unemployment
for lower wages.
Japan, too, must experience more diluted effects of relative cohort size on relative income,
because of widespread adherence to rigid pay scales which are tipped strongly in favor of older more
experienced workers, in order to entice employees into long-term commitment. Here again, young
workers would rarely experience the benefits of smaller cohort size.  That wage structure appears to
have sent fertility rates in Japan into a tailspin which not even declining relative cohort size has been
able to remedy.
The rigidity of a nation’s boundaries with respect to immigration, and its policies toward
“guest workers” as for example in Germany, Austria and Oman, would also impinge on the relative
cohort size/wage relationship.  Tests for any relationship would be most appropriate at a regional
rather than a national level, when workers can cross international boundaries fairly freely.  And
conversely, it is possible that very large countries such as China or the former USSR might contain
many sub-national “markets” in which any relative cohort size effects would emerge most
clearly— especially if the movements of their citizens are restricted by government. 
And at the other end of the causal network it goes without saying that cultural and
institutional differences must impinge on the relationship between relative income and factors such
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as marriage and childbearing.  These cultural effects may show up only as differences in the overall
levels of marriage and fertility, however, rather than in the response to changing economic
circumstances.
But we’re getting ahead of ourselves.  Let’s look at the evidence.
The Evidence
Countries appear not to begin reducing their fertility, despite reductions in infant mortality,
until mortality rates fall among children and young adults, permitting the proportion of those aged
15 to 24 to rise relative to those aged 25 and over.  This is seen in country after country which has
begun the fertility transition since 1950— more than 100 in all.  Several which have not yet begun the
transition, such as Ethiopia, Nigeria and Mozambique, have not yet experienced any increase in the
ratio of 15 to 24 year olds to those aged 25 and over, despite marked and prolonged reductions in
infant mortality in many cases. 
It is even common to observe a decline in relative cohort size in most countries immediately
before it begins to increase, suggesting that mortality rates among older adults tend to fall more
quickly during the transition, than mortality rates among children and young adults.
The relationship between fertility and relative cohort size in these Third World countries
highlights the tragic human toll exacted by the high mortality rates associated with lack of education,
poverty and internal strife.  In country after country we will see a constant— or even declining— ratio
of 15 to 24 year olds to those aged 25 to 59 over many decades despite TFRs of 6.0 or even 7.0 and
above.  These nations are producing scores of infants and children who will never live to make a
productive economic contribution, but who nevertheless consume resources.
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Of course, emigration may contribute to the initial short period of decline in relative cohort
size in these countries, since immigrants are traditionally drawn from the younger age groups of
adults, but it cannot explain the subsequent sharp increase in RCS.  It is more likely that any tendency
toward an increase in the RCS promotes internal and external political strife leading to increased
mortality among young adults, especially in countries with weak and/or corrupt governments.  This
hypothesis is maintained by many theorists who have demonstrated a strong correlation between
cycles of population growth and warfare, such as Goldstein (1988).
But we will return to this question of emigration as a “release valve” encouraging high
fertility, later in this paper.  For now we will simply examine the effects on fertility, of increases in
RCS when they do occur.
The very pronounced relationship between relative cohort size and the Total Fertility Rate is
evident both in the aggregate and in country-specific data, even using data reported at five-year
intervals.  Figure 10 presents graphs for a selection of Third World nations around the globe, where
we can see what will emerge as a characteristic relationship.  We see Total Fertility Rates which are
constant or even increasing until relative cohort size begins to increase: at that point, the Total
Fertility Rate begins to decline.  Although the trend in infant mortality might affect the overall rate
of decline, the pattern of decline and its point of initiation seem in all cases to be set by the trend in
relative cohort size.
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Figure 10: The relationship between the Total Fertility Rate (TFR), relative cohort size (RCS), and infant mortality
(the unmarked solid line) in various individual countries, 1950 to 1995.  
(Source: World Population Prospects, the 1998 revision, United Nations: New York, 1998.  RCS = ratio of population aged
15 to 24 to population aged 25 to 59; TFR has been scaled by dividing by 12.5; infant mortality (in deaths per 1000) has
been scaled by logging and dividing by 11)
This relationship has been demonstrated around the globe, in country after country both small
and large, regardless of religious or political orientation.  Figure 11 shows that it emerges even at the
regional level, in all developing parts of the world.  It is important to note that the characteristic shape
evident in these graphs is not a statistical artifact: the relative cohort size variable used here is
calculated relative only to prime aged adults, not to the total population— thus RCS is not increasing
as a result of the decline in the proportion of children. 
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Figure 11: The relationship between the Total Fertility Rate (TFR), relative cohort size (RCS), and infant mortality (
the unmarked solid line) in developing regions of the world, 1950-1995.  
(Source: World Population Prospects, the 1998 revision, United Nations: New York, 1998.  
RCS = ratio of population aged 15-24 to population aged 25-59; 
TFR has been scaled by dividing by 12.5;
 infant mortality (in deaths per 1000) has been scaled by logging and dividing by 11)
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Country Infant Mortality Rates
1950-55 1990-95 at the start of the
fertility transition
Barbados 132   9  87
Brazil 135  47 109
China 195  44  81
Egypt 200   67 175
Hong Kong  79    6  33
Iran 190  43  78
North Korea 115  24  58
Thailand 132  32  84
Zimbabwe 120  70 101
Table 1: Infant mortality rates (deaths per 1000 live births)
in countries presented in Figure 10.
(Scaled) infant mortality rates are also
presented in Figures 10 and 11, and although
not immediately obvious because of the scaling,
the levels vary widely from country to country,
both at the point of initiation of fertility decline,
and throughout its full extent.  Thus, in Table
1 for example, the transition in Hong Kong did
not begin until infant mortality was down to 33,
while in Egypt it began at the very high level of 175. And although Brazil and Iran exhibit very similar
infant mortality rates in 1990 to 95 (47 and 43, respectively), the TFR in Iran (5.3) is more than twice
that in Brazil (2.44).
One should also note other aspects of the diversity among the nine countries in Figure 10.
Population size (in 1995) ranged from only 260,000 in Barbados, to 1.2 billion in China.  Hong Kong
is only a city-state and Barbados only an island, as compared with the large geographic areas of the
other seven countries.  Iran is a predominately Muslim nation, while Brazil has large proportions of
Roman Catholics.  China and North Korea are not free-market economies— yet they still exhibit this
characteristic pattern.  China is now famous— or infamous— for its draconian “one child” policy, and
many demographers and environmentalists tend to credit that policy with China’s dramatic fertility
decline.  However, several recent studies have indicated that the decline began— at least in urban
areas— prior to that policy,  and the data presented here suggest that the underlying motivation for5
such an urban fertility decline was the increase in relative cohort size.
Macunovich (1999c) presents graphs like those in Figures 10 and 11 for all of the 136
countries which had not experienced a fertility transition prior to 1950.  Nearly all have by now begun
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Figure 12: Relative cohort size and the crude birth rate during the fertility transition in England and Wales, France
and Sweden.  (Crude birth rate is births per 1000 population, but is scaled by dividing by 75.  Relative cohort size is the
population aged 15 to 24 relative to the population aged 25 to 59.  Source: Keyfitz and Flieger, 1968).
the transition, and conform with the pattern discussed above.  A few have not yet experienced any
fertility decline, but many appear to be on the threshold.
In addition, Keyfitz and Flieger (1968) provide historical data for three of the currently
industrialized nations around the time of their own fertility transitions: Sweden, France, and England
and Wales.  Although they do not provide the TFR, unfortunately, they do provide information on
age composition, together with the crude birth rate (births per 1000 population).  These data are
presented in Figure 12:  although not as conclusive, perhaps, as the patterns exhibited in most of the
currently developing countries, these graphs do demonstrate a similar tendency for the fertility
transition to begin just at the point where relative cohort size starts to increase.  Only decennial
observations are available for England and Wales, so it’s possible we miss some of the increase there,
but we see a decided increase in RCS in France.  Sweden experienced a sharp jump in RCS after 1825
which seemed to initiate a tendency for fertility to decline, but this was followed by an equally sharp
drop in RCS which generated some recovery in fertility, so that the real fertility transition only
occurred after 1870— when RCS increased once again
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Relative Cohort -1.355
Size -0.189
 (-8.0)
infant  0.276
mortality  0.090
 ( 3.1)
lagged TFR  0.371
 0.374
 ( 7.0)
No. of obs   1316
adj R-sq 0.3385
The dependent variable is the first
difference of the Total Fertility
Rate (TFR).
All independent variables are
expressed as first differences.
t-statistics are italicized in
parentheses , and normalized
coefficient estimates are in italics.
Table 2: Estimation of the effect
of relative cohort size and infant
mortality on the Total Fertility
Rate in 189 countries between
1950 and 1995, using OLS
regression.
Statistical Tests
For those who are uncomfortable with a simple visual
analysis of the relationship between RCS and fertility, we can use
regression analysis to determine whether the apparent relationship
is statistically significant.  The model we wish to test is very
simplistic, containing only RCS and infant mortality as explanatory
variables, in attempting to explain the trend in the total fertility rate
(TFR).  In order to control for the many other factors which are
thought to play a role in fertility determination, we can include a
lag of TFR itself, which contains information about these other
factors.  That is, the value of the TFR in time t-1 is used as another
variable in explaining the TFR in time t.  This is a very stringent
test, and we will see that infant mortality often loses its significance
under these circumstances— but the estimated effect of RCS
remains quite strong.
Another hurdle has been created in the tests conducted here, by examining only changes in
TFR, RCS and infant mortality.  This has the effect of removing any possible relationship flowing
from past values of fertility and infant mortality to RCS, since generally we would expect to see lower
RCS when fertility is low and infant mortality is high.  These changes in the value of each variable are
calculated as what are termed “first differences” by subtracting the value of each variable in time t-1
from its value in time t.
Table 2 provides an abbreviated version of the results of this type of regression analysis, with
a more complete set of results in Appendix Table A1.  The results in Table 2 are the estimated effects
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of RCS and infant mortality on the TFR when we include all of the 189 countries in the United
Nations data— the forty members of the “early transition” group like the United States together with
Third World countries.  Even though the lagged TFR exerts a very strong effect, RCS maintains a
very significant estimated coefficient which is more than twice the absolute magnitude of the
estimated (standardized) coefficient on infant mortality (-0.189 and 0.090, respectively).
Appendix Table A2 presents similar results for various subsets of the United Nations data:
four groups of countries based on their fertility levels in 1950 to 55— from high (greater than 6.5
births per woman) to low (3.5 births per woman or less)— and nine groups of countries by
geographical region.  It can be seen in Table A2 that, in all cases except two “outlier”
countries— Niger and Cape Verde in Western Africa— RCS exhibits the expected significant negative
effect on TFR.  Infant mortality, on the other hand, retains its positive statistical significance in only
4 of the 13 regressions presented in Table A2.
Probably the most significant aspect of relative cohort size with respect to fertility, however,
is its apparently unique identification of the turning point when the transition is initiated, which is so
evident throughout the graphs presented here and in Macunovich (1999c).
Asymmetric Effects of Relative Cohort Size on Fertility
But many readers will have noted the fact that the TFR in all countries continues to decline,
once it has started the transition, despite a subsequent decrease in RCS.  Aren’t the effects of RCS
on fertility supposed to be symmetrical, with an increase causing the TFR to decline and a decrease
causing it to rise?  That has been the expectation among academics who have tested for cohort size
effects on fertility in the more-developed nations (as reported in Macunovich 1997). 
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This is a very important point, because it bears directly upon Neo-Malthusian arguments such
as those of Abernethy (1996), who maintain that the United States and other developed countries
should close their doors to migrants from, and restrict financial aid to, developing nations in order
to avoid opening an “escape hatch” which only encourages higher fertility among those remaining in
the developing countries.  Emigrants are drawn preponderantly from the younger adult age group,
so that their exit must surely reduce relative cohort size in the originating country.  Why don’t we
observe fertility increasing again in countries, once relative cohort size begins to abate? 
But as emphasized in Macunovich (1999a), relative cohort size effects on relative income are
not symmetrical, because of differential aggregate demand effects on the leading and lagging edges
of a baby boom— thus we should not expect them to be symmetrical in terms of fertility.  Even if
decreasing relative cohort size exerts a positive effect on fertility, that positive force is counteracted
to some extent by the depressing effect of the economic slowdown induced by declining cohort size.
In addition, it seems likely that the awareness of fertility control brought about in the fertility
transition by increasing relative cohort size has a cumulative “snowball” or “cascade” effect, as
declining average family size reinforces a society’s acceptance of smaller numbers of children.  That
strong negative “cascade” effect would also counteract any positive effect on fertility, of declining
relative cohort size.
We can test for this type of asymmetry econometrically using the 1998 United Nation
population and fertility data, with an approach similar to the one adopted for relative income in
Macunovich (1998a, 1999a, 1999b): we can look at the effect of the rate of change in relative cohort
size, as well as the effect of relative cohort size itself.  The hypothesis is that a positive rate of change
will tend to slow the decline in fertility when cohort size is rising, while a negative rate of change will
tend to dampen fertility increases when cohort size is declining.  
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RCS -1.355 -2.038
-0.189 -0.285
 (-8.0) (- 8.3)
RCS change   1.100
 0.176
 ( 4.5)
infant  0.276  0.291
mortality  0.090  0.095
 ( 3.1)  ( 3.3)  
lagged TFR  0.371  0.311
 0.374  0.314
 ( 7.0)    ( 6.6)
No. of obs   1316   1316
adj R-sq 0.3385 0.3464
The dependent variable is the first difference
of the Total Fertility Rate (TFR).
All independent variables are expressed as
first differences.
t-statistics are italicized in parentheses, and
normalized coefficient estimates are in
italics.
Table 3: Estimation of asymmetric effects
of relative cohort size and infant
mortality on the Total Fertility Rate in
189 countries between 1950 and 1995,
using OLS regression.
Our measure of the rate of change in RCS is very crude, however, since we have only
quinquennial observations between 1950 and 1995, and we
hypothesize that any economic slowdown results not so much
from declining relative cohort size, as from the transition to
decline and its effect on expectations and business investment.
Five yearly observations give us only a very weak
identification of that point of transition.  
Despite the weakness in our measure of change in
cohort size, however, we find fairly strong and significant
effects of a change variable, with the expected positive sign,
as demonstrated in Table 3.  Table 3 repeats the results which
were presented in Table 2, and adds in the second column a
set of results in which the basic model is supplemented with an
RCS change variable.  The second column in Table 3 is, once
again, an abbreviated version of regression results which are
presented in full in the Appendix— this time in Table A3.
In this extended model, the positive effect of the lagged TFR supports the idea of a “cascade”
effect on social norms regarding fertility during the transition, with the declining fertility rate in past
years exerting a strong influence on fertility in subsequent years.  This cascade effect together with
the asymmetry of the relative cohort size effect accounts for the continuing decline of the TFR even
once RCS has begun to decline in these developing nations.
This highlights a point which should be emphasized: as indicated in the graphs presented here
and in Macunovich (1999c), countries do not reverse direction once the RCS-induced fertility
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transition has begun.  Apart from Cambodia and East Timor, where mass killings rather than an actual
fertility transition produced substantial changes in TFR and RCS in the late 1970s, there is not a
single case in the 136 countries presented in Macunovich (1999c) in which the TFR increases again
once a country has embarked on the fertility transition, at least until that country’s TFR has dipped
below 2.0.  
It appears that there are two completely separate regimes, pre- and post-transition, with
fluctuations occurring within each of those regimes— but never leading to switching from the low
back toward the high regime.  Thus the instances often cited by Abernethy (1993, 1994a, 1994b,
1996), in which increasing income leads to increases in fertility, are simply cases of fluctuations within
the pre-transition regime, rather than the implied reversals of the fertility transition.
What Are the Effects of Migration on Fertility?
To what extent does emigration act as a “release valve” for “excess population pressure” in
developing countries, thereby leading to increased world population growth, as maintained by
Abernethy (1996)?  We have seen that increasing relative cohort size apparently creates the
motivation for fertility control which initiates fertility transition.  And country after country since
1950 provide historical evidence that the fertility transition, once initiated in a country, has never been
reversed.  However, it seems sensible to assume that emigration, drawn primarily from the younger
age groups, will lower relative cohort size and thus reduce the motivation for fertility control— thus
perhaps slowing the fertility transition, even if not reversing it.
However, the regression results presented in Appendix Table A1 indicate that there are strong
relative cohort size effects on fertility in all countries regardless of initial fertility levels— even in the
industrialized countries which receive the majority of immigrants from the Third World.  Thus, there
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must be some fertility decline in the receiving nations which will to some extent counterbalance the
fertility increase in the sending nations.  This effect on fertility in the destination country has been
postulated by economists such as Kuznets (1958), Easterlin (1968) and Berry (1996) to have
occurred during the period of heavy migration to the United States at the turn of the century.  We
can use our regression results to estimate the relative size of these effects.
Table 4 presents the results of simulations, based on the regression model presented in column
2 of Table 3 and columns 6 to 10 of Appendix Table A3, in which it is assumed that one percent of
the young adults in a given Third World nation emigrate to the United States.  This migration has the
effect of reducing relative cohort size in the sending country— thus raising the
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 (1)           (2)       (3)         (4)         (5)        (6)         (7)        (8)
 Year        number     number     number of   number of    net      additional  migrants’
            of 15-24   of births   new births   births     change    births lost   TFR
            year olds   removed    generated   foregone   in total   if migrants in LDC 
               who      from LDC     in LDC      in US     births       reduce
             migrate                                                  fertility 
                                     (all numbers in thousands)
Bangladesh:
 1965           90        302         76         -89        -13        -152        6.68
 1975          113        397         98        -113        -14        -283        7.02
 1985          169        520        147        -170        -22        -366        6.15
 1995          204        347        183        -206        -22        -137        3.40
Egypt:
 1965           44        158         21         -44        -22         -84        7.07
 1975           64        179         31         -64        -32        -113        5.53
 1985           83        210         42         -83        -40        -134        5.06
 1995          103        195         56        -103        -47         -90        3.80
Ethiopia:
 1965           46        159         37         -45         -8         -82        6.90
 1975           58        197         48         -57         -9        -138        6.80
 1985           74        257         63         -74        -10        -189        6.91
 1995           90        316         79         -91        -12        -223        7.00
 
Indonesia:
 1965          185        503        160        -184        -24        -195        5.42
 1975          212        542        188        -212        -24        -327        5.10
 1985          297        603        268        -298        -30        -333        4.06
 1995          382        553        356        -385        -28        -162        2.90
 
India:
 1965          804       2338        671        -798       -127       -1006        5.81
 1975         1004       2726        866       -1000       -134       -1712        5.43
 1985         1336       2987       1174       -1342       -168       -1770        4.47
 1995         1650       2797       1510       -1665       -154       -1105        3.39
 
Iran:
 1965           36        130         30         -35         -5         -71        7.26
 1975           55        180         47         -54         -7        -124        6.54
 1985           77        261         69         -77         -7        -191        6.80
 1995          111        296        107        -112         -5        -181        5.30
 
Mexico:
 1965           68        231         61         -67         -5        -119        6.82
 1975           98        320         91         -97         -6        -220        6.52
 1985          139        295        132        -140         -7        -168        4.24
 1995          183        285        177        -184         -7         -97        3.12
 
Pakistan:
 1965           85        297         71         -84        -13        -156        7.00
 1975          120        423        104        -120        -16        -301        7.00
 1985          174        612        153        -175        -22        -452        7.00
 1995          235        707        214        -237        -23        -465        6.00
One percent of a nation’s 15 to 24 year olds are assumed to migrate to the US.  This exercise
demonstrates 
- (column 4) how many births would be gained among women remaining in the LDC, and
- (column 5) how many would be lost among women in the U.S., 
as a result of relative cohort size change effects on fertility rates in each country. 
 
Column 6 indicates the world’s net gain or loss in births as a result of the migration, and
column 7 indicates the number of additional births which would be lost if the migrants reduce
their fertility to the current United States level.
  
Calculations are based on the regression results in columns 5 to 10 of Appendix Table A2.
Table 4: Net loss in births resulting from migration between various Third World
countries and the U.S., due to relative cohort size effects on fertility levels.
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fertility of the young adults who remain behind— and increasing relative cohort size in the United
States which in turn lowers fertility there.  Table 4 allows us to trace through and estimate the net
effect of these movements in a variety of countries with a range of population sizes and fertility rates,
in the years 1965, 1975, 1985 and 1995.
As an example, let’s look at the case of Bangladesh in 1965 (the top row in Table 4).  One
percent of the population aged 15 to 24 produces a total of 90,000 migrants (column 2), who at the
1960 to 65 TFR of 6.68 (column 8) would have produced a total of 302,000 children in Bangladesh
(column 3), had they remained there.   Because the Bangladeshi relative cohort size is reduced by this6
out-migration, downward pressure on young men’s relative wages is relieved and fertility increases,
producing 76,000 more surviving births among the young women remaining in Bangladesh, than
would otherwise have occurred (column 4).7
But in the United States relative cohort size would be increased, reducing young men’s
relative wages and fertility there by about 89,000 surviving births (column 5).  Thus overall— contrary
to Dr. Abernethy’s fears— in a global sense the number of surviving births would have been reduced
by about 13,000 (column 6) as a result of this migration to the United States  In addition, since her
stated concern is with overcrowding in Bangladesh as a result of high rates of population growth, it
should be noted that there is a net reduction in Bangladesh’s total population as a result of this out-
migration, of about 316,000 persons (adding together columns 2 and 3 and subtracting column 4).
And those who might be concerned about a welfare reduction among young adults in the
United States, caused by the decline in relative income, may be reassured to note that the reduction
is almost certainly only in relative terms.  Economists such as Simon Kuznets (1958) have identified
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 (1)        (2)       (3)        (4)        (5)       (6)        (7)       (8)      (9)
Scenario  number    number    number of  number of   net     additional    migrants’ TFR    
         of 15-24  of births  new births  births    change   births lost in LDC 
         year olds  removed   generated  foregone  in total  if migrants         needed for
            who     from LDC    in LDC     in US    births     reduce             balance  
          migrate                                            fertility           
                                (all numbers in thousands)
Bangladesh:                                                                                
  1         204       347        153       -172       -18       -137       3.40       .
  2                              213       -239       -26                             .
  3                              183       -206       -22                             .
  4                              153       -239       -85                             .
  5                              213       -172        40                          3.00
Egypt:
  1         103       195         52        -87       -34        -90       3.80       .
  2                               59       -120       -61                             .
  3                               56       -103       -47                             .
  4                               52       -120       -68                             .
  5                               59        -87       -27                             .
Ethiopia:
  1          90       316         66        -76       -10       -223       7.00       .
  2                               92       -105       -13                             .
  3                               79        -91       -12                             .
  4                               66       -105       -39                             .
  5                               92        -76        15                          6.66
Indonesia:
  1         382       553        298       -323       -24       -162       2.90       .
  2                              414       -447       -33                             .
  3                              356       -385       -28                             .
  4                              298       -447      -149                             .
  5                              414       -323        91                          2.42
India:
  1        1650      2797       1265      -1395      -129       -1105      3.39       .
  2                             1754      -1934      -179                             .
  3                             1510      -1665      -154                             .
  4                             1265      -1934      -669                             .
  5                             1754      -1395       359                          2.95
Iran:
  1         111       296         89        -94        -4        -181      5.30       .
  2                              124       -131        -6                             .
  3                              107       -112        -5                             .
  4                               89       -131       -41                             .
  5                              124        -94        29                          4.77
Mexico:
  1         183       285        177       -154        22        -97       3.12    2.88
  2                              177       -214       -37                             .
  3                              177       -184        -7                             .
  4                              177       -214       -37                             .
  5                              177       -154        22                          2.87
Pakistan:
  1         235       707        179       -199       -19       -465       6.00       .
  2                              248       -276       -27                             .
  3                              214       -237       -23                             .
  4                              179       -276       -96                             .
  5                              248       -199        49                          5.58
This Table presents the same type of information as in Table 4, but here we have results in
1995 under five scenarios regarding the rate of change in the flow of migration between the
LDC and the United States (actually the rate of change of the change in relative cohort size).
   -Scenario 1 assumes that the flow is increasing both for the LDC and the U.S.
   -Scenario 2 assumes that the flow is decreasing both for the LDC and the U.S.
   -Scenario 3 assumes a steady state in the flow of migrants (so that the rate of change in
the flow is zero).  This is the scenario presented in full in Table 4.
   -Scenario 4 assumes that the flow is increasing in the LDC and decreasing in the U.S.
   -Scenario 5 assumes that the flow is decreasing in the LDC and increasing in the U.S.
Column 9 indicates, where appropriate, the TFR which the migrants would have to achieve in the
United States in order to balance any overall net gain in births resulting from the migration.
Table 5: A comparison of net births which would have occurred as a result of
changing relative cohort size in 1995 in a range of migration scenarios.
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strong positive aggregate demand effects of immigration which overall would act as a spur to
economic growth and thus tend to increase average wages among United States residents as a whole.
But what of the fertility of the migrants themselves?  If they had remained in Bangladesh they
would have produced about 302,000 births.  If, on the other hand, their fertility were to fall to the
1965 United States level, 152,000 of those births would be averted (column 7)— thus as many as
165,000 births might have been averted in total as a result of the migration (adding columns 6 and
7).
There is considerable evidence in the literature that immigrants do reduce their fertility once
in the United States  For example, Blau (1992) analyzed fertility among immigrant women from 35
high fertility countries in 1970 and 1980 and found that
“immigrants from these on average high-fertility source countries [average TFRs in
excess of 5.5] were found to have very similar unadjusted fertility to native-born
[United States]women.  The number ever born was 0.07 lower for immigrants than
natives in 1970 and only 0.18 higher in 1980.”
She found that immigrant women have 0.2 to 0.5 fewer children than native women with similar
characteristics, and suggests that a primary reason for their dramatic fertility reduction was the strong
price effect of women’s wages among immigrants, which was about 50 percent higher than among
native-born women.  8
However, the results in Table 4 assume a steady state in terms of the flow of migrants
between these countries and the United States; that is, it is assumed that our RCS change variable in
Table 3 is equal to zero.  How would these results be altered under different assumptions?  If the RCS
change variable were positive in the United States, for example, economic conditions would be
somewhat improved, so that fertility would not be reduced as greatly as estimated in Table 4.  
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Table 5 presents a comparison of results under five different assumptions regarding the rate
of change in the immigration flow (and hence in the increase or decrease in relative cohort size in each
country).
! Scenario 1 assumes that the flow is increasing both for the LDC and the United States.
! Scenario 2 assumes that the flow is decreasing both for the LDC and the United States.
! Scenario 3 assumes a steady state in the flow of migrants (so that the rate of change in
the flow is zero).  This is the scenario presented in full in Table 4.
! Scenario 4 assumes that the flow is increasing in the LDC and decreasing in the United
States.
! Scenario 5 assumes that the flow is decreasing in the LDC and increasing in the United
States.
The last is the “worst case” scenario, since it produces the lowest tendency for fertility reduction in
the United States, and the strongest increase in fertility among women remaining in the source
country.  Thus in this one scenario we see in many instances an overall net gain in births as a result
of the migration.  In the case of Bangladesh, for example, there would be a net gain of 40,000 births
in 1995.  But remember that this is a net gain under the assumption that the migrants do not reduce
their fertility at all when they come to the United States  We know that this is a highly unlikely
situation, and columns 8 and 9 in Table 5 indicate that the Bangladeshi immigrants would only need
to reduce their fertility from the 3.40 level in Bangladesh in 1995, to about 3.00 when they are in the
United States, in order to cancel out the 40,000 net gain in births resulting from their migration.
None of the required reductions indicated in Table 5 seem unreasonable, and in many cases they are
almost negligible.
In addition, we must take into consideration the low probability associated with scenario five.
In order for the flow to be increasing in the United States but decreasing in Bangladesh, for example,
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immigration to the United States from some other country would have to be on the increase, so that
a more complete analysis would reveal a net loss of births due to the flow between the United States
and the second LDC, which would probably counterbalance the net gain observed between the United
States and Bangladesh.
As a result, the most likely scenarios in Table 5 are numbers 1 through 3, which in almost all
cases produce unequivocal net reductions in global births.  In results not presented here, this type of
simulation has been conducted using all of the alternative regression results presented in Tables A1
to A3, and under varying assumptions regarding the level of migration— assuming, for example, a
fixed migration of 100,000 from each country to the United States  Although the magnitude of the
loss of births varies with these assumptions and models, the end result remains unchanged in that
there is a net loss of births in virtually all cases, even if the migrant women maintain their native Total
Fertility Rates once they arrive in the United States.
One final issue raised by Neo-Malthusians should be addressed with regard to the relative
income effect on fertility in developing countries.  It has been suggested that immigrant remittances
from the United States— money sent back to relatives in source countries— will tend to increase
fertility in these countries.  Here again, however, one must consider the counterbalancing reduction
in fertility among the immigrants themselves in the United States, which would occur if they were to
send remittances out of their own income.
Thus, we appear to get the best of all possible outcomes with migration: population is reduced
in “overcrowded” Bangladesh, total world population growth is substantially reduced, and upwards
of 150,000 children (adding columns 3 and 7 in Table 4) are given the opportunity of growing up with
all the educational and health advantages of United States residents.
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There are, of course distributional issues involved here, in that some 89,000 births which
would have occurred to United States residents in 1965 in the first row of Table 4 have been
“replaced” by migration.  But this is more an ethical than an economic question— one which requires
soul-searching on our part, if we feel that a birth to a current United States resident should be
preferred over a birth to a new resident.  For those whose concern is with reducing total world
population growth and alleviating the pressures of rapid population growth in the Third World,
migration appears to offer a very effective solution.
Conclusions
We have seen in this analysis that changes in relative cohort size are important in determining
the pattern of fertility— not just in developed countries, as demonstrated in Macunovich (1996, 1998),
but perhaps even more importantly in countries as they pass through the demographic transition.  The
increase in relative cohort size which occurs as a result of declining mortality rates during the
demographic transition, acts as the mechanism of transmission which determines when the fertility
portion of the transition begins.  The increasing proportion of young adults generates a downward
pressure on young men’s relative wages, which in turn causes young adults to accept a trade-off
between family size and material well-being, setting in motion a “cascade” or “snowball” effect in
which total fertility rates tumble as social norms regarding acceptable family sizes begin to change.
Paradoxically, however, despite the importance of relative cohort size in determining fertility
levels, out-migration from currently developing countries experiencing the fertility transition does not
increase the overall level of births, even though it does relieve population pressure there.  This is due
to the fact that the relative cohort size mechanism operates in countries receiving migrants, as well,
so that an influx of migrants increases cohort size and reduces fertility among the residents there.
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Simulations based on regression results for 189 nations over a 45 year period indicate that the net
result of such migration is a reduction in the global number of births.  This overall reduction in births
occurs even if new migrants maintain the fertility rate typical of their source countries.
Thus, relative cohort size can be thought of as the mechanism which prevents excessive rates
of population change— reducing fertility when previous high rates, in combination with low mortality
rates, have caused relative cohort size to increase, and increasing fertility when previous low rates
have caused relative cohort size to decline.   The only “spanner in the works” is the possibility of
institutions which prevent the transmission of relative cohort size effects to male relative income, and
thus to fertility.
KEY TO REGIONAL GROUPINGS OF COUNTRIES:
FIRST WORLD: Russian Federation
North America: Slovakia
USA Slovenia
Canada Ukraine
Oceania: former Czechoslovakia
Australia former USSR
New Zealand former Yugoslavia
Western Europe: former Yugoslav Rep.of Macedonia
Austria
Belgium South America:
France Argentina
United Germany Bolivia
former West Germany Brazil
Luxembourg Chile
Netherlands Colombia
Switzerland Ecuador
Northern Europe: Guyana
Denmark Paraguay
Finland Peru
Iceland Suriname
Ireland Uruguay
Norway Venezuela
Sweden
UK  Central America & the Caribbean:
Southern Europe: Belize
Albania Costa Rica
Greece El Salvador
Spain Guatemala
Portugal Honduras
Malta Mexico
Italy Nicaragua
SECOND WORLD:      Caribbean:
Belarus Bahamas
Bosnia Herzegovina Barbados
Bulgaria Cuba
Croatia Dominican Republic
Czechoslovakian Republic Guadeloupe
Estonia Haiti
Georgia Jamaica
German Democratic Republic Martinique
Hungary Netherlands Antilles
Latvia Puerto Rico
Lithuania Trinidad and Tobago
Moldova
Poland East, SE and South-Central Asia:
Romania      East Asia:
Panama
China Cyprus
Dem.Peoples’ Rep.of Korea Gaza Strip
Hong Kong Iraq
Japan Israel
Macau Jordan
Mongolia Kuwait
Rep. Of Korea Lebanon
     SE Asia: Oman
Brunei Qatar
Cambodia Saudi Arabia
East Timor Syrian Arab Republic
Indonesia Turkey
Lao United Arab Emirates
Malaysia Yemen
Myanmar      North Africa:
Philippines Algeria
Singapore Egypt
Thailand Libyan Arab Republic
Viet Nam Morocco
     Pacific Islands: Sudan
Fiji Tunisia
New Caledonia Western Sahara
Papua New Guinea
Solomon Islands Middle, West & Southern Africa:
Vanuatu      Middle Africa:
Guam Angola
French Polynesia Cameroon
Samoa Central African Republic
    South-Central Asia: Chad
Afghanistan Congo
Bangladesh Dem. Rep. Of the Congo
Bhutan Equatorial Guinea
India Gabon
Iran      Western Africa:
Kazakstan Benin
Kyrgyzstan Burkina Faso
Maldives Cape Verde
Nepal Cote d’Ivoire
Pakistan Gambia
Sri Lanka Ghana
Tajikistan Guinea
Turkmenistan Guinea-Bissau
Uzbekistan Liberia
West Asia & North Africa: Mauritania
     West Asia: Niger
Armenia Nigeria
Azerbaijan Senegal
Bahrain Sierra Leone
Mali
Togo
     Southern Africa:
Botswana
Lesotho
Namibia
South Africa
Swaziland
Eastern Africa:
Burudi
Comoros
Djibouti
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Kenya
Madagascar
Malawi
Mauritius
Mozambique
Reunion
Rwanda
Somalia
Uganda
United rep. Of Tanzania
Zambia
Zimbabwe
                   (1)     (2)       (3)     (4)           (5)     (6)     (7)       (8)
                  Full Model with All Interactions             Parsimonious Model
                 Relative Lagged   Infant  Intercept     Relative Lagged  Infant  Intercept
                  Cohort   TFR   Mortality               Cohort    TFR   Mortality
                   Size                                   Size  
Basic model       -1.884    0.373    0.132   -0.071      -1.355    0.371    0.276   -0.057
(First World)     -0.263    0.376    0.043               -0.189    0.374    0.090
                  (-2.7)   ( 3.9)   ( 0.6)   (-1.3)      (-8.0)   ( 7.0)   ( 3.1)   (-2.2)
regional interactions:                  
South America     -0.177   -0.265    0.254    0.006               -0.170
                  -0.006   -0.089    0.029    0.004               -0.057
                  (-0.2)   (-1.7)   ( 0.5)   ( 0.1)               (-2.2)
                  
Central America    0.828   -0.226    0.445    0.055               -0.113
  & Caribbean      0.041   -0.104    0.082    0.044               -0.052
                  ( 0.9)   (-1.6)   ( 1.0)   ( 0.6)               (-1.8)
                  
East, SE &         1.083   -0.392    0.449    0.032               -0.270
South-Central      0.089   -0.267    0.108    0.034               -0.184
Asia              ( 1.3)   (-3.1)   ( 1.2)   ( 0.4)               (-5.3)
                  
West Asia &        1.048   -0.030    0.240    0.134
North Africa       0.068   -0.012    0.048    0.118
                  ( 1.1)   (-0.2)   ( 0.6)   ( 1.4)
                  
East Africa        0.566    0.068    0.051    0.176                                  0.121
                   0.013    0.015    0.004    0.129                                  0.089
                  ( 0.4)   ( 0.4)   ( 0.1)   ( 1.8)                                 ( 3.5)
                  
Middle, West &     1.255    0.101    0.794    0.601                         0.565    0.532
Southern           0.029    0.021    0.102    0.163                         0.073    0.144
Africa            ( 0.9)   ( 0.6)   ( 1.7)   ( 2.2)                        ( 2.0)   ( 2.1)
                  
Niger &            4.407   -0.681    6.646    0.280       4.033   -0.655    6.432    0.240
Cape Verde         0.128   -0.091    0.178    0.263       0.117   -0.088    0.172    0.225
                  ( 3.3)   (-2.4)   ( 2.3)   ( 3.1)      ( 4.0)   (-2.6)   ( 2.3)   ( 6.2)
                  
Second World       0.969   -0.494   -0.009   -0.034               -0.424
                   0.042   -0.135   -0.002   -0.029               -0.116
                  ( 1.2)   (-3.8)   ( 0.0)   (-0.5)               (-4.5)
fertility-level interactions:
                  
  3.51 - 5.5      -0.815    0.107   -0.038   -0.167                                 -0.163
                  -0.063    0.061   -0.009   -0.161                                 -0.157
                  (-1.0)   ( 0.8)   (-0.1)   (-2.1)                                 (-5.6)
                  
  5.51 - 6.5      -0.573    0.343   -0.947   -0.248                0.261   -0.696   -0.213
                  -0.038    0.207   -0.217   -0.291                0.158   -0.159   -0.250
                  (-0.6)   ( 2.5)   (-2.5)   (-2.9)               ( 4.4)   (-3.8)   (-5.7)
                  
  >6.5             0.155    0.407   -0.071   -0.152                0.384            -0.097
                   0.013    0.264   -0.017   -0.192                0.249            -0.123
                  ( 0.2)   ( 2.9)   (-0.2)   (-1.8)               ( 6.5)            (-3.5)
Number of obs                                 1316                                    1316
F-Statistic                                  15.55                                   34.65
Adjusted R-square                           0.3422                                  0.3385
__________________________
excluding Niger and Cape Verde*
Dependent variable is the year-to-year change in the Total Fertility Rate (TFR).
Relative Cohort Size is the ratio of population aged 15-24 to those aged 25-59.
All variables expressed as first differences.
t-statistics in italics and parentheses, standardized coefficients in italics below estimated
coefficients.
Appendix Table A1: Estimated effects of a change in Relative Cohort Size (RCS) on the
Total Fertility Rate (TFR) in 189 countries between 1950-1995, using an aggregate time-
series cross-section model with full interaction terms for eight regions and three 1950-
55 fertility levels.
                         (1)            (2)             (3)             (4)             (5)
                      Relative        Lagged          Infant         Intercept       No.of obs
                    Cohort Size         TFR          Mortality                      (Adj.R-sq)
By Region:
South America          -2.041 (-2.9)   0.526 ( 5.5)   -0.043 (-0.1)   -0.221 (-3.5)     84 
                       -0.286          0.570          -0.012                         (0.2668)
Central America        -1.531 (-3.0)   0.408 ( 5.4)    0.262 ( 1.0)   -0.213 (-3.6)    133
  & Caribbean          -0.233          0.448           0.079                         (0.2335)
East, SE &             -1.352 (-3.1)   0.258 ( 4.5)    0.077 ( 0.4)   -0.259 (-5.6)    280
South-Central Asia     -0.185          0.264           0.021                         (0.0799)
West Asia &            -0.947 (-2.7)   0.728 (11.3)    0.379 ( 2.1)   -0.070 (-1.7)    168
North Africa           -0.162          0.669           0.126                         (0.4335)
East Africa            -1.298 (-1.6)   0.772 ( 9.4)   -0.256 (-0.9)   -0.072 (-2.2)    112
                       -0.121          0.696          -0.064                         (0.4352)
Middle, West &         -1.136 (-2.1)   0.796 (13.5)    0.070 ( 0.5)   -0.026 (-1.5)    196
Southern Africa         -0.106          0.727           0.028                         (0.5245)*
Niger &                 2.679 ( 2.4)   0.099 ( 0.4)    6.708 ( 2.2)    0.378 ( 1.3)     14
Cape Verde              0.555          0.095           0.479                         (0.5779)
Second World           -0.978 (-2.6)   0.033 ( 0.5)    0.183 ( 1.3)   -0.113 (-3.6)    156
                       -0.208          0.039           0.107                         (0.0407)
First World            -2.044 (-4.5)   0.473 ( 7.9)   -0.024 (-0.1)   -0.125 (-3.3)    173
                       -0.294          0.518          -0.010                         (0.2963)
By fertility level in 1950-55:
  <= 3.5               -0.965 (-2.7)   0.187 ( 3.2)    0.137 ( 1.2)   -0.085 (-3.4)    280
                       -0.158          0.191           0.073                         (0.0641)
  3.51 - 5.5           -1.725 (-4.5)   0.198 ( 3.3)    0.567 ( 2.6)   -0.137 (-2.7)    210
                       -0.291          0.219           0.170                         (0.1460)
  5.51 - 6.5           -1.492 (-3.6)   0.498 (10.0)   -0.125 (-0.7)   -0.156 (-5.5)    357
                       -0.174          0.499          -0.037                         (0.2317)
  > 6.5                -0.668 (-2.5)   0.661 (17.2)    0.439 ( 3.5)   -0.078 (-3.5)    469
                       -0.093          0.637           0.128                         (0.4272)
__________________________
excluding Niger and Cape Verde*
Dependent variable is the year-to-year change in the Total Fertility Rate (TFR).
Relative Cohort Size is the ratio of population aged 15-24 to those aged 25-59.
All variables expressed as first differences.
t-statistics in italics and parentheses, standardized coefficients in italics below estimated
coefficients.
Appendix Table A2: Estimates for 1950-1995 of the effects of a change in Relative Cohort
Size (RCS) on the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) in 189 countries grouped by region and by
fertility level in 1950-55.
                  (1)    (2)     (3)     (4)     (5)        (6)     (7)     (8)     (9)     (10)
                    Full Model with All Interactions                Parsimonious Model
               Relative Change  Lagged  Infant  Inter-    Relative Change  Lagged  Infant   Inter-
                Cohort    in     TFR   Mortality cept      Cohort    in     TFR   Mortality  cept
                 Size    RCS                                Size     RCS 
Basic model     -2.805   1.806   0.350   0.162  -0.064     -2.038   1.100   0.311   0.291  -0.057
(First World)   -0.392   0.289   0.353   0.053       .     -0.285   0.176   0.314   0.095       .
                (-3.4)  ( 2.3)  ( 3.7)  ( 0.7)  (-1.2)     (-8.3)  ( 4.5)  ( 6.6)  ( 3.3)  (-2.2)
regional interactions:
                                                                                         
South America    0.168   0.277  -0.272   0.194  -0.010                     -0.147        
                 0.005   0.007  -0.091   0.022  -0.007                     -0.049        
                ( 0.1)  ( 0.2)  (-1.7)  ( 0.4)  (-0.1)                     (-2.0)        
                                                                                         
Central          2.024  -2.041  -0.130   0.271   0.044             -1.096                
  America &      0.101  -0.106  -0.060   0.050   0.035             -0.057                
  Caribbean     ( 1.8)  (-1.9)  (-0.9)  ( 0.6)  ( 0.5)             (-2.3)                
                                                                                         
East, SE &       1.617  -0.976  -0.342   0.408   0.030                     -0.247        
South-Central    0.133  -0.092  -0.233   0.098   0.032                     -0.169        
Asia            ( 1.5)  (-1.0)  (-2.6)  ( 1.0)  ( 0.3)                     (-5.5)        
                                                                                         
West Asia &      2.207  -1.837   0.039   0.129   0.123      0.840  -0.843                
North Africa     0.143  -0.152   0.016   0.026   0.108      0.054  -0.070                
                ( 2.0)  (-1.8)  ( 0.3)  ( 0.3)  ( 1.3)     ( 1.7)  (-2.0)                
                                                                                         
East Africa      0.728   0.059   0.118   0.002   0.177                              0.120
                 0.017   0.001   0.026   0.000   0.130                              0.088
                ( 0.4)  ( 0.0)  ( 0.7)  ( 0.0)  ( 1.8)                             ( 3.5)
                                                                                         
Middle, West     1.870  -1.049   0.165   0.721   0.562                      0.598   0.247
& Southern       0.043  -0.025   0.035   0.093   0.152                      0.077   0.232
Africa          ( 1.1)  (-0.7)  ( 0.9)  ( 1.5)  ( 2.1)                     ( 2.2)  ( 6.4)
                                                                                         
Niger &          3.786   0.814  -0.452   5.576   0.279      3.966  -0.550   6.008   0.516
Cape Verde       0.110   0.023  -0.061   0.150   0.262      0.115  -0.074   0.161   0.140
                ( 2.3)  ( 0.6)  (-1.6)  ( 2.0)  ( 3.1)     ( 3.9)  (-2.2)  ( 2.1)  ( 2.0)
                                                                                         
Second World     2.412  -2.377  -0.422  -0.144  -0.047      1.090  -1.355  -0.375        
                 0.104  -0.135  -0.116  -0.029  -0.040      0.047  -0.077  -0.103        
                ( 2.4)  (-2.7)  (-3.2)  (-0.5)  (-0.7)     ( 1.6)  (-2.5)  (-4.1)        
                                                                                         
fertility-level interactions:
                                                                                         
  3.51 - 5.5    -1.197   0.445   0.021   0.126  -0.161                             -0.166
                -0.093   0.039   0.012   0.030  -0.156                             -0.161
                (-1.2)  ( 0.5)  ( 0.2)  ( 0.4)  (-2.1)                             (-5.7)
                                                                                         
  5.51 - 6.5    -0.468  -0.413   0.304  -0.915  -0.253              0.266  -0.715  -0.215
                -0.031  -0.029   0.184  -0.209  -0.297              0.161  -0.164  -0.252
                (-0.4)  (-0.4)  ( 2.2)  (-2.3)  (-3.0)             ( 4.5)  (-3.9)  (-5.8)
                                                                                         
  >6.5          -0.086  -0.008   0.363  -0.002  -0.150              0.407          -0.094
                -0.007  -0.001   0.236  -0.001  -0.189              0.264          -0.118
                (-0.1)  ( 0.0)  ( 2.5)  ( 0.0)  (-1.7)             ( 6.9)          (-3.4)
Number of obs                      1316                                       1316
F-Statistic                       13.06                                      28.87
Adjusted R-square                 0.3512                                    0.3464
________________________
excluding Niger and Cape Verde*
Dependent variable is the year-to-year change in the Total Fertility Rate (TFR).
Relative Cohort Size is the ratio of population aged 15-24 to those aged 25-59.
All variables expressed as first differences.
t-statistics in italics and parentheses, standardized coefficients in italics below estimated
coefficients.
Appendix Table A3: Estimated effects, allowing for asymmetry, of a change in Relative
Cohort Size (RCS) on the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) in 189 countries between 1950-1995,
using an aggregate time-series cross-section model with full interaction terms for eight
regions and three 1950-55 fertility levels.
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1. The precise definition of this important age group remains to be determined by future
research.  The use of the 15 to 24 age group is dictated here by its availability in historical and
international data.
2. There is also an effect of relative cohort size on female wages, as analyzed in Macunovich
(1998e) but this is more complex and not as immediately relevant to the present analysis.
3. Male relative income is calculated here as the average annual earnings of young men in their
first five years of work experience (no longer enrolled in school), in year t, relative to the
average annual income of families with head of either sex aged 45 to 54 in year t-5.
4. This is unfortunately a fairly crude measure of relative cohort size, since the younger and
older members of the 25 to 59 age group are fairly good substitutes for those aged 15 to 24,
but it is the only measure permitted by the available data.
5. See, for example, Lavely and Freedman (1990)
6. It’s assumed here that there are equal numbers of men and women among the migrants.  Even
if there were more males than females, fertility would be reduced proportionally among the
women remaining behind, by the shortage of male partners.
7. We apply Bangladesh’s 1960 to 1965 infant mortality rate of 155 per 1,000 to estimate
potential surviving infants.
8. These results correspond with those of other researchers such as Kahn (1988).  One must
look critically at claims such as the following by Linden (1994): “. . .peasant families tend to
have two or three children in Mexico City, while those who immigrate to the U. S.  average
four or five children.”  Statements like these often compare apples (average family size of
women of all ages) and oranges (family size of recent immigrants, who tend to be women in
their peak reproductive years).
Endnotes
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